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DURABLE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE TENTH
CIRCUIT: A FOCUS ON EFFECTIVENESS IN THE
REMEDIAL STAGE
DANIEL MCNEEL LANE, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Two players begin a game of chess. Each player knows the moves
each piece can make, how to capture her opponent's pieces, and other
rules of chess. But neither player knows how to win - neither player
knows the definition of checkmate. Is it the King she is after, or the
more powerful Queen? Need she capture the bishops and knights as
well? Now suppose -the game lasts not for hours, but for decades. At
times, the players are hostile and frustrated, at other times they seem
almost cooperative, working.only to bring the game to an end.
The game described above is not unlike the school desegregation
litigation experience of the last three decades. Skilled lawyers struggle
relentlessly over such issues as the need for a desegregation plan, the
terms of the plan, the particulars of its implementation, and so forth.
Yet they have no clear definition of the end result they seek - unitary
status - because the courts have yet to define "checkmate" for school
desegregation purposes. Both sides are kept off-balance. Neither side
knows what remedies the plaintiff is entitled to, or what showing the
school district must make to satisfy its duty to desegregate.
Without establishing a clear definition of unitary status, in three re-
cent cases the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has pointed the way to-
ward checkmate, announcing endgame rules for school desegregation
contests.1 These decisions touch on every facet of school desegregation
remedial measures, yet a single message emerges: school districts oper-
ating under a duty to desegregate must take steps that will effect lasting
changes in the school system. Understanding the scope and import of
the Tenth Circuit's decisions requires a brief overview of federal school
desegregation doctrine. In Brown v. Board of Education ("Brown I"),2 the
starting point, the Supreme Court established that segregation of public
school students on the basis of race violates the equal protection clause
* Associate, Paul, Weiss, Riikind, Wharton & Garrison, New York; The University
of Texas School of Law, J.D., 1988; Columbia College, B.A., 1984. The author is grateful
to Britt Banks for his thoughtful criticism of earlier drafts of this Article.
1. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,895 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1990),petition for cert filed, 58
U.S.L.W. 3725 (U.S. Apr. 30, 1990)(No. 89-1698); Brown v. Board of Educ., 892 F.2d 851
(10th Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3725 (U.S. Apr. 26, 1990)(No. 89-1681);
Dowell v. Board of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1521
(1990).
2. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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of the fourteenth amendment.3 The following year the Supreme Court
stated in Brown II4 that school authorities operating segregated school
systems 5 bore the "primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and
solving" local school problems that prevent the transition to a "racially
nondiscriminatory school system." 6 Subsequent school desegregation
doctrine has divided, like the Brown decisions, into liability and remedial
phases, in some cases more neatly than in others.
Supreme Court school desegregation doctrine has undergone a
legal mitosis of sorts, as right and remedy issues have grown more and
more distinct, remaining connected only at the root - the equal protec-
tion clause. In Green v. County School Board, for example, the Court stated
that school boards operating a dual school system are charged with the
"affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to
a unitary system in which racial desegregation would be eliminated root
and branch."' 7 Moreover, the Court added that each instance of a failure
or refusal to fulfill this affirmative duty constitutes a further violation of
the fourteenth amendment. 8 But, after taking the necessary steps to
eliminate racial segregation, the school board need do no more, even if
shifting demographic patterns resegregate the schools. 9 The conun-
drum should be obvious: after implementation of the "remedy," the
school district may, in all essential respects, be identical to the school
district at the time the remedy was ordered.' 0
A variety of factors may explain this apparent gap between the right
initially declared and the remedy eventually obtained.' I Professor Free-
man argues that the courts improvidently settled on an approach to the
problem of race discrimination from the perspective of the perpetrator
rather than the perspective of the victim. Consequently, the courts have
focused on school boards' discriminatory actions rather than on the in-
ferior conditions under which minority students often must seek an
education. 1 2
The perpetrator perspective presupposes a world composed of
atomistic individuals whose actions are outside of and apart
from the social fabric and without historical continuity. From
this perspective, the law views racial discrimination not as a so-
cial phenomenon, but merely as the misguided conduct of par-
3. For a scholarly, yet moving, account of the events leading up to the decision, see
R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISToRY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EqUALrrY (1975).
4. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
5. In Brown I, the Court consolidated appeals from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia
and Delaware. 347 U.S. at 486.
6. Brown, 349 U.S. at 299, 301.
7. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
8. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 459 (1979).
9. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
10. See Branton, The History and Future of School Desegregation, 109 F.R.D. 241, 248
(1986).
11. See generally Note,Judicial Right Declaration and Entrenched Discrimination, 94 YA.E LJ.
1741 (1985).
12. See Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Anti-Discrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1052-57 (1978).
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ticular actors. It is a world where, but for the conduct of these
misguided ones, the system of equality of opportunity would
work to provide a distribution of the good things in life without
racial disparities and where deprivations that did correlate with
race would be "deserved" by those deprived on grounds of in-
sufficient "merit."' 3
In the years following Brown, the Supreme Court has viewed the equal
protection clause as a means of righting discrete wrongs rather than as a
means of doing right.'
4
Professor Strauss characterizes this phenomenon as the "taming" of
Brown. Courts tend to focus on discriminatory intent because they per-
ceive it as a sharply defined limit that least threatens social order.' 5
Practical considerations are also at work--courts may respond to intense
political and economic strains associated with complete remedies by
"narrowing the right to match the remedy."' 6 Finally, while courts are
quite adept at recognizing and defining rights, they may be wary of en-
gaging in protracted affirmative management of complex social
problems.
17
The antidiscrimination model of equal protection creates problems
of proof that may bar liability altogether. Those who were instrumental
in creating segregated conditions are often long gone. In their place are
officials whose commitment to equality may be quite genuine, but who
are equally committed to local control of schools and an end to bussing.
More importantly, segregated conditions in the schools usually result
from broader patterns of discrimination in housing and employment.
Only a piece of the pattern is within the purview of the court, which can
hardly hold school boards solely responsible for apartheid-like social
conditions that contribute to inequality in the schools.
The Court has sought to relax these problems of proof, not by re-
laxing the discrimination requirement itself, but by instituting proce-
dural mechanisms to aid the plaintiff in establishing discriminatory
intent.18 For instance, in Keyes v. School District No. 1,19 the Court stated
that when intentional segregative actions take place in a significant part
of the school district, unconstitutional intent will be presumed in the
13. Id. at 1054.
14. See Strauss, Discriminatoy Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHi. L. REv. 935,
940-51 (1989).
15. Id at 954-56.
16. Judicial Right Declaration, supra note 11, at 1762-63.
17. Institutional features of the courts, such as law of the case and stare decisis, some-
what justify this wariness. Each decision of a court binds, to a greater or lesser degree,
subsequent decisionmaking on the same subject. Government agencies, on the other
hand, are relatively free to shift directions radically. Ironically, shifts in the Justice Depart-
ment's civil rights agenda, particularly under William Bradford Reynolds, most dearly
demonstrate this principle. See, e.g. Martin v. Wilks, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 2191-93 (1989)(Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
18. See Days, School Desegregation Law in the 1980's: Why Isn't Anybody Laughing?, 95 YALE
LJ. 1737, 1746-53 (1986). Professor Days characterizes the school board's continuing
affirmative responsibility to desegregate as one of these hurdles.
19. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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district as a whole.20
Adopting the approach of the Supreme Court's remedy cases, the
Tenth Circuit's recent school desegregation cases at times purport to be
no more than procedural housekeeping. In truth, the equal protection
rights at stake are inextricably intertwined with the court's holdings
which clarify the parties' burdens and dust off injunctive relief doctrines.
In these cases, the Tenth Circuit sought to resolve the prior doctrine's
emphasis on discriminatory intent with the need to provide minority
schoolchildren with more than transitory vindication of their equal pro-
tection rights. The result of these cases is that once the plaintiffs estab-
lish the school district's segregative intent, they need not fight that
battle over again with every subsequent challenge to district actions.
In each case before the Tenth Circuit, the school district attempted,
in response to plaintiffs' objections to district policy, to establish that it
had satisfied its duty to desegregate. Consequently, each school district
urged the district court to terminate jurisdiction over the matter. Usu-
ally, termination ofjurisdiction entails declaring the school district "uni-
tary," which, in simplest terms, means that the district is no longer
operating a "dual" school system. In effect, any decree under which the
school district is operating is dissolved, and total control over school
matters is returned to the school district. The issues on which these
cases turned involved demonstrating the school district's entitlement to
a declaration of unitariness or termination of jurisdiction.
This article discusses Keyes, Brown, and Dowell in the order in which
the issues they address would likely arise in the course of school deseg-
regation litigation. In Keyes, a vigorously litigated case, the district court
denied the school district's motion for a declaration of unitariness and
termination of jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, 'agreeing that
the Denver desegregation plan, incorporated in the district court's de-
cree, was not complete by its terms. In Brown, the district court declared
the school district unitary after the plaintiffs challenged school condi-
tions following a period of dormancy. The Tenth Circuit reversed on
the basis of clear error. Finally, in Dowell, the district court terminated
jurisdiction eight years after it declared the school district unitary. The
Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the protection of the court decree
was still necessary to protect desegregation gains in Oklahoma City.
II. KEYES V. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1
A. Background
By the Tenth Circuit's own count, its third opinion in Keyes v. School
District No. 121 was the eighteenth federal court opinion published in
this case.2 2 Keyes began in 1969, when a group of Denver schoolchil-
dren, by and through their parents, sued to enjoin the school board
20. Id. at 203.
21. 895 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1990).
22. Id. at 661 n.1.
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from rescinding three previously adopted resolutions. The intent of
these resolutions was to facilitate desegregation of the Denver school
system.23 The district court ultimately found that the school board pur-
sued a policy which maintained, encouraged, and continued segregation
in the public schools. 24 In 1974, the district court ordered a desegrega-
tion plan, 25 which, with slight modifications, remains in effect today.
26
In 1984, the school district moved for an order declaring the Denver
schools unitary, dissolving the injunction with respect to student assign-
ments, and terminating the district court's jurisdiction in the case.2 7
Plaintiffs opposed the motion and moved for an order directing the
school district to produce plans and policies to remedy perceived short-
comings in the district's desegregation efforts.
28
At the hearing, and on its motion, the district argued that a decade
of compliance with the court-ordered desegregation plan entitled the
district to a declaration of unitariness. 29 In a lengthy opinion, the dis-
trict court considered the board's policies, attitudes, and understanding
with respect to desegregation of the Denver schools. The court also
considered statistical evidence that it found troubling.3 0 The court de-
nied the district's motion for declaration of unitary status, and instead
ordered the district to submit a plan for achieving unitary status. The
plan was to address faculty assignment, student transfer policies, and
desegregation of three minority elementary schools. The school district
submitted the plan as ordered.3 '
In 1987, the district court issued an "interim decree" intended to
"relax the degree of court control over the Denver public schools." Es-
sentially, the decree eliminated reporting requirements and allowed the
school district to make changes in the desegregation plan without prior
court approval.8 2 The court characterized the interim decree.as a step
toward terminating the court's jurisdiction. The school board appealed
the denial of unitary status and the entry of the "interim decree."3 3
On appeal, the district made several arguments, using as a basis the
Supreme Court's opinion in Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler.
3 4
First, the district argued that long-term compliance with the court-or-
dered desegregation plan, which it characterized as complete in design
and not contemplating later judicial reappraisal, entitled the school dis-
trict to a declaration of unitariness.3 5 The district argued that the
23. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 303 F. Supp. 279, 281 (D. Colo. 1969).
24. IME at 287.
25. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 380 F. Supp. 673 (D. Colo. 1974).
26. Keyes, 895 F.2d at 661.
27. Id at 661-62.
28. I at 662.
29. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 609 F. Supp. 1491, 1498 (D. Colo. 1985).
30. Keyes, 895 F.2d at 662-63.
31. Id at 662.
32. Id at 663.
33. Id.
34. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
35. See id at 435-37; Keyes, 895 F.2d at 664-66.
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school system should be declared unitary with respect to student assign-
ments even though it may not be unitary with respect to either faculty
assignments or its student transfer policy. 3 6 The school district argued,
citing Spangler, that the district court erred in focusing on the racial iden-
tity of three elementary schools, and in demanding future maintenance
of a racial balance. The school district argued that there was no consti-
tutional right to a particular racial balance in a school's student body,
3 7
and that segregative effects of future board actions were irrelevant to the
unitariness determination. Finally, the school district argued that there
was no evidence indicating that future boards would act with segregative
intent.3 8
B. The Unitariness Inquiry
The court in Keyes recounted school desegregation law from Brown
v. Board of Education, recognized the district court's broad equity powers,
and noted that such remedial measures are reviewed only for an abuse
of discretion.3 9 Recognizing that the Supreme Court "has not defined
precisely what facts or factors make a district unitary," the Tenth Circuit
considered the elements which cause the segregation of a school sys-
tem.40 Racial balance in student assignments is but one factor. Courts
must also consider the existence of individual discrimination in trans-
portation of students, integration of faculty and staff, equality of finan-
cial support to different schools and integration of school activities, and
the presence or absence of a discriminatory pattern in the construction
and location of new schools.
4 1
The court then set forth the definition of unitariness newly minted
in Dowell and Brown.42 "This Court has defined 'unitary' as the elimina-
tion of invidious discrimination and the performance of every reason-
able effort to eliminate the various effects of past discrimination." 43 In
light of this standard, "when a school board has a duty to liquidate a
dual system, its conduct is measured by 'the effectiveness, not the pur-
pose, of [its] actions in decreasing or increasing segregation caused by
the dual system.' ",44
36. Keyes, 895 F.2d at 664.
37. Id.
38. The United States, appearing as amicus curiae in a brief submitted by former Assis-
tant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds, argued that the district court must ter-
minate jurisdiction over a case when it finds the district to be unitary. The district was
unitary here, in the government's view, because it had fully implemented a court-approved
desegregation plan in good faith. Id
39. Keyes, 895 F.2d at 664-65.
40. Id. at 665. Note, Allocating the Burden of Proof After a Finding of Unitariness in School
Desegregation Litigation, 100 HARv. L. REv. 653, 662 (1987) (asserting that the Supreme
Court has declined to provide a definition because "it has recognized that no single, inflex-
ible formula could apply to all school systems").
41. Keyes, 895 F.2d at 665.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 85-88, 144-54.
43. Keyes, 895 F.2d at 665-66 (citing Dowell v. Board of Educ., 895 F.2d 1483, 1491 &
n.15 (10th Cir. 1989); Brown v. Board of Educ., 892 F.2d 851, 859 (10th Cir. 1989).
44. Id. at 666 (quoting Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1979)).
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The court reviewed the district court's finding that the Denver Pub-
lic School System was not unitary under a dear error standard. 4 5 The
school district, however, failed to identify or even assert dear erroi in
the district court's decision. 4 6 The school district instead argued that
"as a matter of law three racially identifiable elementary schools out of
about eighty cannot prevent a school district from attaining unitary sta-
tus." 4 7 This is a factual argument dressed up as a legal argument to
obtain a standard of review less deferential to the trial court. The court
of appeals rejected this argument, observing that the existence of even
only three racially identifiable schools, "especially when they once have
been eliminated and then resurface as a result of board action, is strong
evidence that segregation and its effects have not been eradicated."
48
With respect to such schools, the district must show that they "are non-
discriminatory and that their composition is not the result of present or
past discrimination."'4 9 A showing merely that the resegregation of the
schools is not the result of new, intentional segregation did not satisfy
the district's burden.
The court then turned to the district's argument that compliance
with the court-approved plan for ten years entitled it to a declaration of
unitary status. The court rejected this argument, agreeing with the
court below that the desegregation plan adopted in 1974 "was not in-
tended to be complete in itself; rather, the court and the district had 'the
expectation that changes would be required in future years.' -50 The
Tenth Circuit concluded that the evidence adequately supported the
finding that student assignments were not unitary, rendering harmless
the district court's error in failing to recognize that a school district may
be declared unitary in some respects and not others.5 '
Finally, the court deferred to the district court's finding that the
school district "was both without the ability and without the will to en-
sure that the effects of prior segregation [would] not resurface."
' 52
C. The Interim Decree
The district court crafted its decree to meet the specificity require-
ments of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d),53 yet remain broad
45. Id. at 666.
46. i at 666-67.
47. Id at 667.
48. Id See also Note, Allocating the Burden of Proof After A Finding of Unitariness in School
Desegregation Litigation, 100 HARV. L. REv. 653, 662-63 (1987) (noting that the Supreme
Court has never "produced a single, comprehensive statement defining unitariness" be-
cause "U]ust as the methods for desegregating dual school systems necessarily vary with
the circumstances, so does the determination whether desegregation has been
successful").
49. Keyes, 895 F.2d at 667.
50. Id at 667 n.2 (quoting the district court, 609 F. Supp. at 1506).
51. Id, at 667.
52. Id
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 65 states, in relevant part:
(d) Form and Scope of Injunction or Restraining Order.
Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the
1990]
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enough to allow the school district to operate free of direct court inter-
vention.54 The decree did not prescribe racial balance targets for stu-
dent or faculty assignments, nor did it require prior court, approval of
student or faculty assignment changes by the district. Instead, the de-
cree conferred broad authority on the district to operate the schools
while, at the same time, it prevented adoption of discriminatory school
policies. 5 5
On appeal, the school district challenged the decree, arguing that
its lack of clarity violated Rule 65.56 In a meticulous review, the court
eliminated only one paragraph of the fourteen paragraph order. The
court reasoned that the paragraph only required the school district to
obey the law.5 7 On the whole, the court disagreed with the school dis-
trict, approving of the order as "a commendable attempt to give the
board more freedom to act within the confines of the law."5 8 Despite
the district's "frustration with not knowing its precise obligations under
the Constitution," the court agreed with the trial court's conclusion that
the school district "has not accomplished all desegregation possible and
practical," though it remains under a continuing duty to db so.5 9
III. BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
The Tenth Circuit's recent opinion in Brown v. Board of Education,
6 °
contrasts starkly with the landmark opinions of the same name.6 1 Long
and complex, it delves into the intricate factual setting from which the
case evolved. 6 2 The proposition upon which Judge Seymour based the
opinion, however, was straightforward: plaintiffs bringing a school de-
segregation action against a former dejure segregated school system are
entitled to a presumption "that current disparities are causally related
reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable
detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts
sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the parties to the action, their
officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in
active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by
personal service or otherwise.
54. Keyes, 895 F.2d at 663.
55. See id at 668 n.5.
56. Id at 668.
57. Id
58. I d at 669.
59. I d at 670.
60. 892 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1989).
61. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ("Brown '); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) ("Brown II").
62. The majority and dissenting opinions in Brown are marked by contentious ex-
changes, including numerous references to "revised" opinions. See, e.g., Brown, 892 F.2d
at 862. References to "revised" opinions also appear in Dowell, and are unfortunate in
both decisions. First, of course, earlier opinions have little meaning for the reader, who
has access only to the "revised" opinion released. Second, and more importantly, the
references imply that the original opinion was flawed, and any revision was merely cos-
metic. To the extent a judge seeks to avoid such sniping, the judge, is discouraged from
revising his opinions in response to criticism of earlier drafts. Such revisions, however,




to past intentional conduct."63
A. Backgound
At the time of the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, the Topeka Board of Education operated segregated schools
at the elementary level only.64 State legislation allowed segregation be-
low high school level, and the Kansas Supreme Court had already de-
clared segregation in Topeka junior high schools unconstitutional.
65
Oliver Brown and other black citizens of Topeka filed a class action chal-
lenging the statute's authorization of school segregation below the high
school level, and in the Supreme Court's decision secured the sweeping
rejection of the "separate but equal" doctrine. The board took immedi-
ate steps to desegregate, permitting black students to attend former
white schools even before the Supreme Court's decision in Brown I. On
remand, the district court approved the board's "Four Step" desegrega-
tion plan, but did not terminate jurisdiction over the case.66
In the mid-1970s, the Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") of the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW") initiated administra-
tive enforcement proceedings against the Topeka School District,
alleging that the school district was not in compliance with Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.67 The board obtained a preliminary in-
junction against the administrative proceeding,6 8 but both the adminis-
trative proceeding and the injunction action were dismissed when the
board submitted a plan acceptable to HEW in 1976. The board subse-
quently implemented the plan.
69
In 1979, a group of black parents and children filed a motion to
intervene in the original proceeding as additional named plaintiffs.
They asserted that the school district failed to desegregate its schools in
compliance with the Supreme Court mandate, and they alleged that the
school district maintained and operated a racially segregated school sys-
tem.70 The district court granted the motion to intervene and, after a
period of discovef y and motion practice, conducted a trial in October
1986.71. The Court decla'ed the school district an integrated, unitary
school system. 72
63. Brown, 892 F.2d at'854.
64. Id.
65.'IM
66. Id. at 885. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 139 F. Supp. 468,,470 (D. Kan. 1955).
67. -42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1982). The Topeka School District was required to comply
with section. 601 of the Civil Rights Act because it received federal funds through the
Kansas Department of Education. Brown, 892 F.2d at 855 & n.2.




72. Id. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 671 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Kan. 1987). The court also
held that the school district did not violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In
addition, the court dismissed the Governor of Karisas from the case and exonerated the
State Board of Education from liability for racial conditions in the school district. Brown,
892 F.2d at 855.
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Despite population growth, today, as in 1950, Topeka's population
remains approximately 10% black.73 Hispanics comprise about 5% of
the population; other minorities comprise less than 1.57. 74 Since the
1950s, the white population has spread westward, the black population
has mostly spread eastward, and the inner city has declined. 7 5 Mean-
while, the percentage of black and minority76 children in the Topeka
schools has grown steadily since 1952, with black students representing
8.4% of the Topeka student population. During the 1985 school year,
18.4% of the students in Topeka were black, and 25.95% were members
of a minority group.
77
In 1951, Topeka operated four black and eighteen white elementary
schools. Under the Four Step plan, which was adopted to eliminate the
effects of de jure segregation in 1955, two elementary schools became
more than 20% black, while three remained more than 99% black.
Through the late 1950s and early 1960s, Topeka annexed outlying ar-
eas, and various schools were closed and opened. By 1966, Topeka no
longer had any all-black elementary schools, though three schools re-
mained all white, and nearly half of all minority elementary school stu-
dents attended schools with minority populations of more than 50%'.
7 8
The 1976 reorganization of Topeka elementary schools, prompted
by the OCR proceedings, took place after the minority population in
Topeka schools climbed to 20.9%. Even after the reorganization, more
than a third of minority elementary school students attended four
schools with minority populations of more than 50%. Nearly 60% of
the white elementary school students attended elementary schools with
white populations of more than 807. 79 The racial balances in the
schools remained approximately the same when the district court heard
the case in 1985.80
The 1979 action challenged conditions in the junior high and high
schools for the first time. The student populations of the junior high
and high schools of Topeka were not segregated by race at the time of
the Supreme Court's decision in 1954. At the time, however, five of the
six junior high schools had white populations of more than 80%; the
sixth had a minority population of 307.81 By 1966, after a period of
annexation and expansion, eight of the eleven junior high schools had
white populations of more than 80%; one junior high had a minority
73. Brown, 892 F.2d at 855.
74. Id
75. Id at 855-56. This pattern is similar to that in Oklahoma City. See infra text ac-
companying note 179.
76. The parties agreed that distinguishing between blacks and other minority students
would serve no purpose.
77. Brown, 892 F.2d at 856.
78. Id at 856. One elementary school had a minority population of nearly 50%, while
four schools had minority populations of more than 50%, ranging as high as 93.1%.
79. Id at 856-57. Almost a quarter of all white students attended 90+7 white
schools.
80. Id at 857. The only notable difference was that the lowest percentage of minority
students in any elementary school rose to 7.2%.
81. Id The lowest percentage of minority students in any school rose to 7.2%.
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population of 61.80.82 The high school minority populations ranged
from a high of 25%, to a low of .4%.
At the time of the trial in 1985, the percentage of minority students
in Topeka middle schools was 26.9%, and the level in high schools was
23.8%.83 Two of six middle schools had white populations of more
than 90%; one had a minority population of nearly 49%.84 Two high
schools had minority populations near 30%, and one had a white popu-
lation of more than 90%.
B. Determining Unitary Status
Before it could consider the central issue in Brown - whether or not
the Topeka school system was unitary - the court had to establish a
touchstone definition of unitariness. Essentially, the court of appeals
adopted the district.court's definition: a unitary school system is "one in
whichthe characteristics of the 1954 dual system either do not exist or,
if they exist, are not the result of past or present intentional segregative
conduct of [the school district]." 85 The court added that "[a]n addi-
tional essential requirement of unitariness is whether, however, 'school
authorities [made] every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of
actual desegregation, taking into account the practicalities of the
situation.' ",86
Judge Seymour rejected a snapshot approach in determining
whether the school district attained unitary status - that is, one which
considers the state of the school system only at the time of trial. Rather,
"a court must consider what the school district has done or not done to
fuLfill its affirmative duty to desegregate, the current effects of those ac-
tions or inactions, and the extent to which further desegregation is feasi-
ble."18 7 But, once the plaintiff establishes intentional segregation in the
past by the school district, and a current condition of segregation, the
burden shifts to the defendant to prove that "its past acts have elimi-
nated all traces of past intentional segregation to the maximum feasible
extent."88
In a case such as Brown, where past intentional segregation by the
school district has long since been established, the plaintiff's principal
burden is to prove a current condition of-segregation. The court held
that to satisfy this burden the "plaintiff must prove the existence of ra-
cially identifiable schools, broadly defined." 8 9 Student assignments
alone may identify a school as racially identifiable, as in the case of vir-
tual one-race schools. But racial identifiability may also turn on other
82. Id at 858. Minority students comprised 15.3% of the junior high school student
population and 14.9% of the high school student population.
83. From 1976 to 1981, Topeka adopted a middle-school/high-school system.
84. Brown, 892 F.2d at 858 & n.13.
85. Id at 859 (quoting Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1293).
86. Id (quoting Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971)).
87. id
88. Id
89. Id at 859-60.
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factors, such as faculty assignments or community and administration
attitudes towards the school. 90
The court next focused on the issue of one-race schools. While
such schools are not per se unconstitutional, their existence in a school
system with a history of dejure segregation gives rise to a presumption
that they result from discrimination. 9 1 The existence of one-race
schools thus satisfies the plaintiff's initial burden of showing a current
condition of segregation. As a result, the burden of persuasion shifts to
the school system. 9 2 The court in Brown, of course, did not confront a
school system in which the district maintained schools with 90+7o mi-
nority student populations. 93 In 1985, however, minority students
made up only 25.95% of the student population.
9 4
The question then is how to determine the existence of racially
identifiable schools in Topeka. The Tenth Circuit refused to focus
solely on the distribution of minority students among district schools.
The court stated that whatever the percentage of minority students in a
school district, "[i]t is dear that a school with 90+7o students of one
race is a predominantly one-race school.., whether the students at the
school in question are white or minority."9 5 The court's reasoning
yields a straightforward rule: proof of the existence of 90+7 white
schools, in a school system that mandated segregation in the past, shifts
to the school district the burden of proving that the existence of the
essentially all-white schools is not the result of past intentional
conduct.
9 6
Judge Baldock, dissenting, sharply differed with the majority over
this burden-shifting mechanism. In particular, the majority and dissent
differed on what the plaintiff must prove to shift the burden of persua-
sion to the school district.9 7 The dissent argued that in a former dejure
segregated school system, the plaintiffs must "establish the prima fade
case by proving that there is a current condition of intentional segrega-
tion, [and] that the dejure system or its vestiges remain or were reestab-
lished in part of the school system."9 8 The burden then shifts to the
school district to prove that "segregative intent was not among the fac-
90. Id. at 860.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Dowell v. Board of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483, 1487 (10th Cir. 1989).
94. Brown, 892 F.2d at 856.
95. Id at 860.
96. The court further observed that, even absent racial imbalances, it may determine
that schools are racially identifiable based on demography, geography, history of particu-
lar schools, and areas of the city. Id. at 860-61. Given the existence of 90+7o white
schools in Topeka, the presence of these factors in Topeka only bolstered the court's ulti-
mate conclusion.
97. Not satisfied with demonstrating the majority's asserted error of laii', however,
Judge Baldock seemed intent on showing that the majority's every point, every statement,
and every observation, were wrong. Judge Baldock criticized the majority for making "its
own factual findings after an ad hoc evaluation of the evidence." Id. at 889 (Baldock, J.,
dissenting). Yet, he engaged in his own tedious review of the record. Id
98. Id. at 892.
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tors that motivated their actions." 99 UnderJudge Baldock's approach, if
the school district cannot disprove segregative intent, it may satisfy its
burden by showing that "past. segregative acts did not create or contrib-
ute to the current segregated condition." 10 0 Essentially, the dissent's
proffered burden-shifting scheme entails a search for segregative intent
at every level.
The majority, on the other hand, concluded that the inquiry into
intent was resolved when the court initially found an equal protection
violation. Consequently, the district was required to negative any con-
nection to the previously established discriminatory intent. "Once a
plaintiff has proven the existence of a current condition of segregation,
the school district bears the substantial burden of showing that that con-
dition is not the result of its prior dejure segregation."' 0'1 The school
.district does not satisfy its substantial burden merely by showing an "ab-
sence of invidious intent," or even by showing a "firm commitment to
desegregation."' 1 2 Rather, the school district must show that it has
taken steps to satisfy its affirmative duty to desegregate - it must show
"action that in fact produces a unified school district."' 0 3 Any action
that perpetuates the dual system, therefore, violates the school district's
duty to desegregate.'
0 4
Judge Seymour emphasized that the plaintiff need not prove that
the current condition of segregation is the result of intentional segrega-
tion-that is, that the school district intended to segregate the students
by race in pursuing its policies.' 0 5 Instead, any action that perpetuates a
dual system violates the school district's duty to desegregate.'
0 6
"Where plaintiff has established segregation in the past and the present,
it is 'entitled to the presumption that current disparities are causally re-
lated to prior segregation, and the burden of proving otherwise rests on
the defendants.' ,07 The court justified this approach on the basis of
fairness and also found it necessary to ensure that "subconscious racial
discrimination does not perpetuate the denial of equal protection to our
nation's schoolchildren."'
10 8
There is also an institutional consideration not mentioned by the
court. The school district is in the position to establish the absence of
cause or connection between prior segregative conduct and a current
99. Id. (quoting Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 211 (1973)).
100. Id.
101. Brown, 892 F.2d at 861.
102. Id at 861-62.
103. Id at 862 (emphasis in original).
104. Id. (quoting Pitts v. Freeman, 755 F.2d 1423, 1427 (11th Cir. 1985)).
105. Id
106. Id at 862 (quoting Pitts v. Freeman, 755 F.2d 1423, 1427 (11th Cir. 1985)).
107. Id at 863 (quoting School Bd. v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308, 1311 (4th Cir. 1987)).
108. Id. The court's use of the term "subconscious racial discrimination" has an unfor-
tunately contentious psychoanalytic ring to it. The term conjures up a vast shared subcon-
scious which somehow spins forth school policy through the unwitting actions or inaction
of school administrators. For support, the court refers to one law review article, rather
than to any evidence in the record. See Lawrence, The ld, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reck-
oning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 327 (1987).
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condition of segregation, and properly bears the burden of so doing. 0 9
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, typically have no meaningful access to evi-
dence which affirmatively establishes a connection. Aside from being
fundamentally fair, placing the burden on the school district comports
with traditional notions of logic and efficiency in duty allocation.
The court next examined the means by which a school district can
negate the cause or connection between past segregative conduct and a
current condition of segregation. The passage of time alone may sup-
port the district's argument that any relationship between the two is too
attenuated for one to have caused the other.1 10 But the school district
must also show the measures it has taken to integrate. Absent proof of
affirmative action, the court will presume that the current condition of
segregation results from prior intentional segregative conduct. "A
showing that the school district has not promoted segregation and has
allowed desegregation to take place where natural forces worked to that
end is insufficient.""' While "[n]eighborhood schools are a deeply
rooted and valuable part of American education," a neighborhood
school plan must be scrutinized carefully where the neighborhoods are
themselves segregated, because such a plan tends to prolong the exist-
ence of segregation in schools. 12 A neutral neighborhood school plan,
administered "in a scrupulously neutral manner," will not fulfill the af-
firmative duty to desegregate if it fails to enhance racial balance. 113 The
court should also consider the school district's decision not to take cer-
tain actions that either promote or discourage segregative effects.' 14 Fi-
nally, evidence of the school district's intent is important to determine
how the district's actions have shaped current conditions in the school
district.' 15
Beyond the absence of a cause or connection, the defendant school
district must demonstrate that it has done everything feasible to achieve
maximum practicable desegregation. 116 Judge Seymour warned that,
while courts should be practical, they "must not let long standing racism
blur their ultimate focus on the ideal."
' 17
C. A Current Condition of Segregation in Topeka
Because the district court improperly allocated the parties' respec-
tive burdens of proof, Brown would seem ripe for remand. 18 After all,
109. Cf. Missouri v.Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651, 1654 (1990) ("Authorizing and directing
local government institutions to devise and implement remedies not only protects the
function of those institutions but, to the extent possible, also places the responsibility for
the problems of segregation upon those who have themselves created the problems.").
110. Brown, 892 F.2d at 863.
111. Id. at 863-64.
112. Id. at 864.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 865.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 866.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 890 (Baldock, J., dissenting).
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the court identified an error of law that goes to the very heart of the
district court's finding of facts. The majority noted that "the court fo-
cused too greatly on the school district's lack of discriminatory in-
tent."1 19 The district court's error was in "limiting the school district's
burden merely to showing that it had nondiscriminatory reasons for act-
ing as it did." 120 Not having the burden at trial to come forward with
evidence negating the causal connection between its past conduct and
the school district's current condition, the district did not attempt to do
so. But, rather than remanding the case to allow the school district to
make such a showing, the court of appeals launched into a "more spe-
cific review of the record" to determine whether the district court's find-
ing of unitariness was clearly erroneous. The court justified this
approach first by noting that "much of the record evidence consists of
statistics and other undisputed facts," and second by disclaiming any
reliance on disputed expert testimony. This is a troubling approach, for
Brown is not a case in which the statistics speak for themselves. Judge
Seymour conceded that this case is a close one in which "statistics alone
do not appear as egregious" as in other cases. 12 1 But, the court none-
theless adopted the mantle of expert.
The court then turned to the conditions in Topeka to determine
whether the plaintiffs had demonstrated a current condition of segrega-
tion which would shift the burden of proof to the defendants. The court
first noted that in a school system such asTopeka's, where the minority
student population is relatively small, the concentration of minority stu-
dents is the "hallmark of discrimination." 122 The court observed that,
whether measured in absolute percentage terms or measured as a func-
tion of relative deviation from district-wide minority student population,
a number of schools in Topeka are racially identifiable by student as-
signment. 123 The court also concluded that a number of schools were
racially identifiable by faculty and staff assignment. 124 Looking at these
factors together, the court discerned "a clear pattern of assigning mi-
nority faculty/staff in a manner that reflects minority student assign-
ment. This correlation is fatal to the school district's effort to show a
lack of current segregation." 1 25 The court also found that the racial
identifiability of the schools is supported by their geography, the resi-
dential population in the areas surrounding the schools, and the history
of the schools. 126 For instance, the district located schools in the outly-
ing white areas of Topeka; which were traditionally attended by almost
exclusively white student populations. 127
The presence of racially identifiable schools shifted the burden of
119. Id. at 867.
120. Id. at 868.
121. Id. at 867.
122. Id. at 869.
123. Id. at 870.
124. Id. at 871.
125. Id. at 872.
126. Id. at 873.
127. Id.
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proof to the school district. The court held that the school district failed
to meet its burden in proving the absence of a causal link between the
former dejure segregation in Topeka and the current condition of segre-
gation.1 28 The court noted that any lessening of segregation in the
school district since the initiation of the district's Four Point plan in the
1950s, which the district argued was sufficient to satisfy its duty to de-
segregate, was due to demographic population shifts rather than any ac-
tion by the district to promote integration.
1 29
The court ultimately found a causal link between the former dejure
segregation and the current segregative condition. First, the court
chronicled the desegregative efforts or lack of efforts through the de-
cades since the Supreme Court's decision in Brown. °30 Next, the court
looked to various individual factors that over time "most clearly demon-
strate the continuing causal link between past and present segrega-
tion." - 1 These factors included student and faculty/staff assignments
over time, attendance boundary determinations, and the locations of
schools that the district has both opened and closed over the years. Fi-
nally, the court considered a number of schools it believed illustrated
the causal link.
After deciding that Topeka could do more to eradicate the effects of
past segregation and segregative acts, the court recognized the district
court's error in declaring the Topeka system unitary.' 32 The court,
though reluctant to ascribe ill motives to the school district, found fault
in Topeka's failure to "actively strive to dismantle the system that ex-
isted." The court also found fault in the district's investment of "little
or no thought" to the effects of its actions on the segregative character-
istics that remain from the 1950s. "Where prior dejure segregation ex-
ists . . .we are convinced that permitting white schools and minority
schools to remain racially identifiable as such without significant efforts
to the contrary is in effect to permit the continuation of a dual system of
education." 1 3 3
128. Id. at 874.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 874-77.
131. Id. at 877.
132. Id. at 886.
133. Id. The court also reversed the district court's holding that the school district did
not violate section 601 of Tide VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) and
34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b). The court concluded that the same actions or inactions that violated
the equal protection clause also violated Title VI. The court affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the Governor of Kansas on both the constitutional
and Title VI claims, and the court's finding that the State Board of Education was not
responsible for racial conditions in the school district. The state constitution granted him
no authority to remedy the circumstances existing in the Topeka school district. Id. at 887.
Nor did the plaintiff show that the State Board of Education had the power to act to rem-
edy the constitutional regulations. Id at 888. Kansas statutes authorized only the local




IV. DOWELL v. BOARD OF EDUCATION
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Dowell v. Board of Edu-
cation,'3 4 and in reviewing the decision- may for the first time map out
the steps necessary to terminate federal jurisdiction. Thus, Dowell may
be associated with the close of the desegregation era, as Brown is associ-
ated with its birth, and Keyes with its maturity.1 3 5
A. Background
The unusual procedural context in which the district court decided
Dowell distinguishes it from Keyes and Brown. The district court declared
the Oklahoma City School District unitary in 1977, but did not terminate
jurisdiction over the case at that time. When the school district imple-
mented a new student assignment program in 1984, the plaintiffs moved
to reopen the case.13 6 The plan resulted in dramatic racial imbalances
in the elementary schools: eleven of the sixty-four elementary schools
enrolled 90+7 black student populations, and twenty-one enrolled
90+7 non-black student populations.1 3 7 In the district as a whole,
whites comprised 47% of the student population, blacks comprised
40%, and nonblack minorities comprised 137.138
In 1985, the plaintiffs filed a motion to intervene and to reopen the
case. This occurred after the school board adopted the Student Reas-
signment Plan ("the Plan"), without first seeking court approval. 139
Although the subsequent hearing was ostensibly limited to the issue of
whether the intervenors could reopen the case and intervene, the court
considered numerous substantive issues, including the constitutionality
of the Plan. 140 The district court dissolved the 1972 decree and termi-
nated jurisdiction over the case.
The Tenth Circuit reversed on appeal, holding that the court
abused its discretion in failing to reopen the case and- in prematurely
reaching the merits of the Plan's constitutionality. 14 1 The court's man-
date to the district court on remand was quite specific. The court found
that once the plaintiffs proved that the defendants- violated the 1972
mandatory order by adopting the Plan, the burden shifted to the defend-
ants to prove either that changed conditions required modification of
134. 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989).
135. See Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law: A Criti-
cal Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1057-1102 (1978).
136. 1&. at 1486.
137. Id at 1487.
138. Id at 1495 n.30. The plan affected only elementary schools; student populations
in grades five through twelve were undisturbed. 'These drcumstances contrast ironically
with those in Brown, in which the original plaintiffs attacked segregation in the elementary
schools of Topeka, Kansas. Thejunior high and high schools were not subject to dejure
segregation. Only in the most recent proceedings did the intervenor-plaintiffs attack the
condition of segregation in those schools. See supra text accompanying notes 64-72.
139. Id. at 1486.
140. Id at 1487.
141. See Dowell v. Board.of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516, 1523 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 938 (1986).
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the order or that the facts or law no longer required the enforcement of
the order.
14 2
The Tenth Circuit in 1986 expressly declined to consider the issue
of the Plan's constitutionality. Instead, the court confined remand to a
determination of whether the order would be enforced or whether and
to what extent it would be modified. 14 3 The eight-day hearing on re-
mand focused largely on the issue of whether substantial demographic
changes in the Oklahoma City School District rendered inequitable and
oppressive the desegregation plan under the prior order.144
At issue was the 1972 decree, which required the school district to
comply with the Finger Plan in making student assignments.145 Under
the Finger Plan, black elementary school students in grades one through
four were bussed to previously all-white elementary schools. Moreover,
white fifth-grade students were bussed to "fifth year centers" located in
previously black elementary schools.' 46 A number of "stand-alone"
schools, located in racially balanced neighborhoods, served as neighbor-
hood elementary schools not subject to bussing.
14 7
The Finger Plan was in effect until the board adopted the Student
Reassignment Plan for the 1984-85 school year. 148 The Plan assigned
all students in grades one through four to their neighborhood schools,
thereby eliminating compulsory bussing of those students entirely.
149
The Plan also provided several features, such as a "majority-to-minor-
ity" transfer option. This option was implemented to prevent inequities
in the neighborhood school approach.15 0 The fifth year centers, middle
schools, and high schools continued to maintain racial balance through
bussing under the Plan.15 ' In the sixty-four elementary schools subject
to the Plan, however, blacks comprised 90+ 7o of the student population
in eleven district schools, and less than 10.7%o in 21 others.'
5 2
The court considered a demographic analysis of the school district
population, the history of the Plan's preparation and adoption, the views
of the various community members on issues relating to the Plan, and
the numerous programs the district adopted to promote contacts be-
tween black and white students in grades one through four. The district
defended the neighborhood schools program on the bases that it pro-
moted parental involvement in the elementary schools, and that it
avoided subjecting children to long bus rides in the morning. More-
over, the district stated that "educationally, it is better for a child to have
142. Id
143. I
144. Id at 1487-88.
145. Id. at 1486 & n.1. The Finger Plan was named for its author Dr.John A. Finger,
Jr., a Rhode Island College Professor of Education.






152. Id. at 1487 & n.2.
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a family nearby." 1 53
Ultimately, the district court concluded that demographic changes
rendered the Finger Plan inequitable because black students in the first
through fourth grades would have to travel longer and longer distances
to attend integrated schools as new areas of the district qualified for
stand-alone status. According to the district court, these demographic
changes were legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors that motivated adop-
tion of the Plan. The Plan, in the school district's view, effectively main-
tained a unitary district while promoting increased parental and
community involvement in the schools. 154 Accordingly, the court dis-
solved the 1972 decree mandating compliance with the Finger Plan. 155
B. Modifying Court-Ordered Desegregation Plans
Constrained by a prior panel's decision in review of the district
court's decision, Judge Moore, writing for the majority, resorted to well-
established black letter law regarding modification of injunctions.
15 6
The court embraced the standard enunciated in United States v. Swift &
Co.,157 which required "[niothing less than a clear showing of grievous
wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions" to justify modifying
an injunction. Swift's exacting standard recognizes that modification
based on anything less than a compelling showing of change would al-
low the parties to repeatedly assault the injunction. In effect, the parties
could reverse the judgment of the trial court based on evidence unavail-
able or not presented when the court made its decision. The court also
considered "whether the changes are so important that dangers, once
substantial, have become attenuated to a shadow."'
15 8
[T]o pass muster under this test, the party seeking relief from
an injunctive decree 'must demonstrate dramatic changes in
conditions unforeseen at the time of the decree that both
render the protections of the decree unnecessary to effectuate
the rights of the beneficiary and impose extreme and unexpect-
edly oppressive hardships on the obligor." 59
Judge Baldock, dissenting, took issue with the court's reliance on
Swift. He stated that "principles specifically concerning the process of
desegregation have been enunciated by the Supreme Court." 160 First,
the dissent distinguished Swift and the other injunction cases relied
upon by the majority, noting that those cases involved injunctions which
153. Id at 1488.
154. Id at 1489. The court also rejected the plaintiff's alternative plan, the Foster
Plan, as unnecessary and not feasible.
155. Id
156. See id at 1489-91.
157. 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932).
158. Dowel!, 890 F.2d at 1490 (quoting Swift, 286 U.S. at 119).
159. Id (quotingJost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond- Modifiation of Injunctions in the Fed-
eral Courts, 64 TEx. L. REv. 1101, 1110 (1986)).
160. Id at 1513 (Baldock, J., dissenting).
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forbade or limited only private commercial conduct. 161 The dissent fur-
ther pointed out that different considerations may apply when a court
decides whether to modify prohibitory injunctions from when a court
considers modification of a primarily mandatory injunction involving
complex affirmative duties. 162 Finally, the dissent stated that desegrega-
tion decrees typically contemplate modification as circumstances
change, and that the Swift standard deprived the court and school dis-
trict of the "practical flexibility" contemplated by the Supreme Court
where a school district is seeking to establish a racially nondiscrimina-
tory school system.' 63
Judge Baldock's criticism echoes the late Judge Friendly of the Sec-
ond Circuit, who rejected a rigid interpretation of Swift in King-Seeley
Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Industries,'" opting instead for an approach that
allowed the trial court to rely on the parties' experience under the
decree:
While changes in fact or in law afford the dearest bases for al-
tering an injunction, the power of equity has repeatedly been
recognized as extending also to cases where a better apprecia-
tion of the facts in light of experience indicates- that the decree
is not properly adapted to accomplishing its purposes.' 65
The Second Circuit has since employed this more flexible standard in
institutional reform litigation that requires ongoing judicial supervi-
sion.' 66 Judge Baldock's proffered approach differs from the Second
Circuit approach in that it would turn on the type of case in which the
injunction was entered, and might have the unfortunate effect of creat-
ing a patchwork doctrine under which dubious and legalistic distinctions
between cases determine whether injunctions should be modified.
Whatever the merits of the dissent's position, the Tenth Circuit has
yet to adopt a more flexible modification standard, and a prior panel
determined the setting within which the majority had to reach its deci-
sion. The prior holding in Dowell specifically framed the issue on re-
mand in terms of the showing necessary under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b) to justify modification or dissolution of the injunction.
It was a decision rendered under this mandate from which the plaintiffs
appealed.' 6
7
Having set forth the standard, the court established a threshold
showing that must be satisfied in order to establish entitlement to a
modification of the injunction. The "condition that eventuates as a
161. Id at 1514 (quoting Spangler v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239, 1245 n.5 (9th Cir.
1979) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
162. Id. at 1515.
163. Idt (quoting Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300-01).
164. 418 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1969).
165. Id. at 35. Though King-Sely concerned a consent decree, it relied heavily onjus-
tice Fortas' opinion in United States v. United Shoe Machinery, 391 U.S. 244, 248 (1968),
which involved a litigated decree.
166. Kozlowski v. Coughlin, 871 F.2d 241, 247 (2d Cir. 1989); New York State Ass'n
for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 970 (2d Cir. 1983).
167. Dowell, 890 F.2d at 1487 & n.5.
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function of the injunction cannot alone become the basis of altering the
decree absent the Swift showing,"' 68 nor can compliance alone satisfy
the Swift showing.' 69 The school district must establish by dear and
convincing evidence either that the conditions which led to the original
decree no longer exist, or that the condition the order sought to allevi-
ate has been eradicated.' 70 Any change of conditions must go to the
very heart of the purpose of the decree to justify its modification.'
7 1
Under the majority's approach, a declaration of unitariness plays
little role in determining whether the decree should be modified. At
most, a declaration of unitariness addresses the goal of the injunctive
relief - the elimination "root and branch" of racial discrimination en-
forced through a dual school system. 172 Consequently, the district,
even if unitary, must show a substantial change in the circumstances
which led to the issuance of the decree, in order to justify the dissolution
of the decree.
173
C. Changed Conditions in Oklahoma City
No. one disputed that the board's adoption of the Plan violated the
express terms of the 1972 decree. 174 A prior panel held that the board's
action, in violating the decree, opened the door for the plaintiffs to chal-
lenge "the presumptions premised in the declaration of unitariness."' 7 5
The court held that the emergence of thirty-two "one-race majority" el-
ementary schools, out of a total sixty-four elementary schools, "not only
establishes a prima facie case that the decree has been violated and the
presumption of unitariness challenged, but also satisfies plaintiffs' bur-
den in reopening and shifts the burden to defendants to produce evi-
dence of changed circumstances or oppressive hardship.' 7
6
The board sought to satisfy its "heavy burden" of showing that the
Plan would not perpetuate or reestablish a dual school system by dem-
onstrating that substantial demographic changes established conditions,
unforeseen at the time of the decree's entry, which created hardships so
"extreme and unexpected" as to render the decree oppressive. 17 7 The
court agreed that the board showed substantial changed circumstances,
but concluded that the school district failed to establish that the dangers
to which the decree was directed had disappeared. 178
168. Id at 1490.
169. Id- at 1491.
170. Id. (distinguishing Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 437-38
(1976)).
171. See id. at 1492. Though it should seem obvious from this course of analysis, the
intent of the parties in proposing changes in the decree or adopting changes that violate
the decree has little or no relevance.
172. Ia at 1491.
173. Id- at 1490.
174. Id. at 1492-93.
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Essentially, the school board sought to show that at the time the
decree was entered, most blacks lived in the inner-city areas of
Oklahoma City, but that in intervening years, many blacks moved from
the inner city to the north, east and south portions of Oklahoma City,
thereby lengthening the bus ride for black elementary school students.
The court scrutinized the district's evidence, including the district's
study of the population movement within seven inner-city tracts, includ-
ing the district's study identifying "substantial turnover" in the black
inner-city population of Oklahoma City.
179
The plaintiffs attacked the district's study as too narrowly focused.
The plaintiffs claimed that the study failed to consider either predomi-
nantly black neighborhoods just to the north of the study area, or the
effects of highway construction that forced a portion of the population
out of the study area. Moreover, while the district established popula-
tion turnover within the tracts studied, it failed to distinguish between
those who moved within the neighborhood and those who moved from
the neighborhood to other parts of the city.
The court also considered the parties' conflicting evidence on the
impact of bussing elementary school children.18 0 Obviously, demo-
graphic changes in the school district would be of less import if the dis-
tance the district bussed students had no effect on their education. The
school district offered evidence that black children who were bussed to
school tested lower than those who attended neighborhood schools.' 8 '
The district also argued that bussing had an adverse emotional impact
on the child. 182 Again, the plaintiffs attacked substantial deficiencies in
the district's study, including the study's failure to take into account so-
cioeconomic differences between the children bussed and the children
attending school in their neighborhoods.'
8 3
The court concluded that the substantial body of conflicting evi-
dence in the case pointed to' differing explanations and potential solu-
tions, but that the most significant uncontradicted evidence in the
record was the emergence of lopsided enrollment patterns in the ele-
mentary schools. "Of the approximately 6,464 black students attending
the District's elementary schools K-4, 2,990, or 46.2% of all black ele-
mentary schoolchildren in the District attend the eleven 90%+ black
elementary schools."' 8 4 The conflicting evidence in the record simply
failed to satisfy the district's heavy burden ofjustifying such a condition
of racial imbalance.
The court also rejected the district's argument that the stand-alone
schools' emergence under the Finger Plan created an extreme and unex-
pected hardship that justified modifying or dissolving the decree. The
179. Id at 1494.
180. Id at 1496.
181. Id
182. Id
183. The court also considered racial balance, racial contact indices (such as the "dis-
similarity index"), and census data.
184. Id at 1497.
[Vol. 67:4
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
district argued that as elementary schools in racially balanced neighbor-
hoods became stand-alone schools, black children who had been bussed
to those schools were bussed even farther to attend elementary
school.185 Because stand-alone schools offer kindergarten through fifth
grade classes, their growth shrinks the pool of students for fifth-grade
centers located in black communities. Consequently, these centers
would have to close. The court concluded, however, that the emergence
of stand-alone schools is hardly inevitable. Indeed, eight of the original
stand-alone schools which opened in 1972 have lost their stand-alone
status. Other schools entitled to stand-alone treatment were not desig-
nated as such because of capacity problems, budget constraints, and lo-
cal politics. 186
D. The Failures of the Student Reassignment Plan
Though the evidence of changed circumstances failed to convince
the court that the decree should be modified, the court was convinced
that the Finger Plan mandated by the decree should be modified.'
8 7
The court's order contemplated changes in the Finger Plan from the
beginning, requiring only that the school board obtain prior court ap-
proval before altering or deviating from the Plan.' 8 8 The court ex-
amined the Plan to determine whether it "encompasses the changed
circumstances and maintains the continuing prospective effect of the de-
cree," in which case dissolution of the decree would be appropriate.' 8 9
As framed by the court, the central question was whether the Plan re-
lieved the effects of changed circumstances and potential hardship or
whether it made the district "un-unitary" by reviving effects of past dis-
crimination. 190 The court utilized three factors to determine whether
the Plan maintained unitariness in student assignments-the number of
racially identifiable schools that emerged under the Plan, the school offi-
cials' good faith in the desegregation effort, and whether the district had
attained the "maximum practicable desegregation of student bodies at
the various schools."'19 1
The court of appeals expressed its concern that implementation of
the Plan "has the effect of reviving those conditions that necessitated a
remedy in the first instance."' 9 2 The district court had concluded that
even though the Plan created one-race schools, it did not violate the
equal protection clause unless the board adopted it with discriminatory
intent. The district court had also dismissed racially identifiable faculty
assignments as the product of teacher preference and seniority policies,
and had relied on the district's projection that it would soon bring ele-
185. Id
186. Id at 1498.
187. Id
188. See Dowell v. Board of Educ., 338 F. Supp. 1256, 1273 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
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mentary faculties into racial balance. The majority instead focused on
evidence in the record that racial imbalances in faculty assignments were
becoming more rather than less pronounced. Predominantly black ele-
mentary schools were increasingly staffed by predominantly black
faculties.
1 93
The majority doubted the efficacy of the Plan's majority-to-minority
transfer option. Few parents knew of the option, which was also subject
to the capacity limitations of transferee schools. Thus, even if parents
were aware of the transfer option, their child might not obtain a space in
the parents' preferred school. Nor did the majority credit other features
of the Plan, such as the Effective Schools, Student Interaction, and
Adopt-A-School programs, which focused respectively on improving
test score performances, bringing together students of different races
from different schools, and raising private funds for educational pur-
poses. The court concluded that the Equity Committee and Equity Of-
ficer established under the Plan were ineffective to achieve meaningful
equality among the elementary schools because of limitations on the of-
ficials' discretion to make substantial expenditures. These programs,
the court concluded, were merely "cosmetic trappings" that impeded
the district's ability to achieve unitary status.194
Finally, the court concluded that the district court erred in focusing
on the issue of whether the board adopted the Plan with discriminatory
intent. The court found that the district court invited incompetent evi-
dence through its persistent inquiries of witnesses, lay and expert,
whether they believed the Plan was adopted with discriminatory
intent. 195
The district court misperceived the inquiry mandated by Swann in
determining whether the Plan achieved or maintained unitary status.
The district court was obligated to determine whether the Plan counter-
acted the continuing effects of past school segregation. The court
looked to the Plan's effectiveness in maintaining unitary status, and con-
cluded that the Plan failed. 196 Accordingly, the court directed the dis-
trict court, on remand, to modify the Finger Plan in order to
accommodate the changed circumstances, maintain racially-balanced el-
ementary schools, and assure that faculties achieve racial balance. 19
7
V. CONCLUSION
The two chess players with whom we began characterize the frustra-
tion and uncertainty that often attend school desegregation litigation.
Lack of a clearly defined goal encourages gamesmanship and intransi-
gence, and often pits one group in the community against another. The
three recent Tenth Circuit cases provide no answers to the player's
193. Id at 1500.
194. Id at 1504-05.
195. Id. at 1502-03.
196. Id at 1504.
197. I at 1505-06.
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quandary. There can be no single definition of checkmate for desegre-
gation purposes because there is no single game. Every board differs in
size and shape, and every game has different pieces with different func-
tions. Indeed, there rarely are only two players, but rather usually four
or five or more. Ultimately, Denver is not Pasadena, nor is it Topeka or
Oklahoma City.
The Tenth Circuit has provided direction. For instance, a school
district is no more entitled to declaration of unitariness for achieving
racial balance in a given percentage of its schools, as the court showed in
Keyes, than a member of the student population is entitled to a given
racial balance in her school. Nor does strict compliance with a court-
ordered plan satisfy the district's duty to desegregate if the plan itself is
not complete in its terms. The district's duty is to desegregate, not to
comply with fixed desegregation rules.
The courts in Brown and Dowell, while disdaining rigid rules for de-
termining unitary status, are more concerned with the mechanics of liti-
gating the question. To this extent the court strengthens the hand of
plaintiffs by declining to compel them to prove intentional discrimina-
tion in every challenged act of the school district. The court also looks
to a broad array of factors to determine the district's status, moving
away from a focus on student racial composition as the nearly exclusive
measure of a district's efforts. In sprawling prairie towns like Topeka
and Oklahoma City, the location and construction of new schools, and
the annexation of new areas may play nearly as large a role in the
unitariness determination as student racial composition.
Finally, these three cases could well have political ramifications at
the local level. Those officials who have persistently resisted school de-
segregation often have undermined attempts to fashion a complete rem-
edy, forcing the courts to order provisional measures. It seems clear
now that compliance with such measures, for however long, cannot en-
sure that the districts will be deemed unitary. Those most opposed to a
federal presence in school administration may have unwittingly helped
prolong it.
1990]

